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of intelligence prevents her from pre-
senting real insights, which readers
must find for themselves. Still, the
depth of the author’s research and her
superior understanding of the German
psyche are definite enablers for an as-
tute reader.
On the basis of extensive archival re-
search as well as interviews with former
officers, the author describes how the
Stasi succeeded in stealing technical
plans, equipment, and software. At-
tempting to gain an economic edge on
the West, East Germans spent thou-
sands of marks to steal millions of
marks’ worth of technology. Macrakis
also describes the ultimate futility of
this effort: East Germany could not in-
corporate the technology faster than the
West could innovate and thus lagged
farther and farther behind. Stealing
technology is relatively simple, but in-
corporating that technology and mak-
ing it an effective part of a national
economy is not.
Another major challenge for the Stasi
was Western technology-control re-
gimes. While imperfect and imple-
mented long after the Stasi had begun
its operations, these regimes signifi-
cantly increased the effort required.
Eventually, the cost of stealing and the
inability of East Germany to integrate
what it took doomed the Stasi’s efforts
to failure.
Contemporary critics of current
technology-control regimes should note
that many nations have learned from
the Stasi’s mistakes and now make the
transfer of “know-how” a key element
of their technological-industrial-
economic espionage programs. Those
charged with enforcing technology-
transfer laws can also learn lessons from
this work.
JOHN R. ARPIN
Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia
Winkler, Jonathan Reed. Nexus: Strategic Com-
munications and American Security in World War
I. New York: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008. 358pp.
$55
In March 1921, the U.S. subchaser SC-
154 fired on a cable ship attempting to
land a transoceanic cable near Miami,
Florida. The cable to South America
would have been operated under for-
eign control. While the ship was un-
damaged, the cable never reached land.
The lessons of World War I had left the
United States willing to use force rather
than allow a new foreign-controlled
communications link to North Amer-
ica. In his excellent study, Jonathan
Winkler recalls these episodes, describ-
ing the international and naval commu-
nications structures of the era, their
influence on the war, and America’s
recognition of its dependence on for-
eign communications systems. The
Navy, with a cadre of technical experts
and the need to command and control
a worldwide fleet, played a central role
in shaping a U.S. communications
policy intended to reduce these
vulnerabilities.
The years before World War I represent
the start of our networked world.
Trade, overseas news, colonial admini-
stration and the coordination of far-flung
military forces all became dependent on
a web of undersea communications ca-
bles, supplemented by a limited number
of long-range radio stations. Under-
standing this dependence, both Great
Britain and Germany entered the war
with contingency plans to cut enemy
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cables at sea. However, British naval su-
periority ensured that damage from
German attacks could be quickly re-
paired. Despite later German successes
in using submarines to attack undersea
cables, geography and infrastructure
left Great Britain as the hub of the re-
maining international communications
system. While some of this story will be
broadly familiar to readers of Barbara
Tuchman’s classic study The Zimmerman
Telegram, Winkler moves well beyond
Tuchman’s work, describing how Brit-
ain’s information blockade emerged as
a coordinated effort that complemented
and reinforced its naval and economic
blockades of Germany.
Initially, many in the U.S. government
and Navy were sympathetic to British
efforts. Even while neutral, the U.S.
Navy cooperated, by closing German
wireless stations in the United States.
However, the British stranglehold on
German communications had the effect
of leaving the United States dependent
on British cables to Europe and Latin
America. British monitoring of cable
traffic, a valuable source of military in-
telligence, also yielded commercial in-
formation that was used to further
British trade––often against U.S. com-
mercial interests. Reliable reporting of
news from Germany became impossi-
ble, leaving the neutral American press
dependent on British reporting of the
war. The divergence of American and
British interests forced the U.S. Navy’s
realization that control of communica-
tions had become an essential part of
control of the seas in the modern age.
In response, several U.S. government
agencies moved to build an American
cable network, but they were hampered
by British control of raw materials.
Others turned to emerging technology.
Largely through Navy efforts, the
United States ended World War I with
the largest radio network in the world.
However, the lack of a coordinated U.S.
strategy and poor interagency coordina-
tion ultimately prevented the nation
from dominating the international
communications system after the war.
Winkler asserts that the lessons learned
from this failure provided the impetus
for American dominance of interna-
tional communications in years
following the Second World War.
This is an excellent book with a com-
pelling story. Winkler deftly handles a
complex topic that cuts across issues of
naval history, intelligence, economics,
and technological change. Nexus is well
worth the time of any naval officer con-
templating the sources of American de-
pendence in a networked age.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Commander, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S.
Seventh Fleet
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler, The Germans, and the Final
Solution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2008. 394pp. $35
This insightful collection of essays from
the leading scholar of the Third Reich is
a must-read for any serious student of
the Second World War. Kershaw’s mas-
tery of the intricacies of the Nazi regime
is second to none, and he approaches
the historical controversies surrounding
its reign of terror in as calm and delib-
erate a manner as the topic permits.
Kershaw’s essays cover a variety of top-
ics, but he frequently returns to the
questions surrounding Adolf Hitler’s
direct involvement in implementing the
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